WWW.EXFILE.COM -- 888-775-4789 -- HARSCO -- RESPONSE LETTER
HARSCO
CORPORATION
350
Poplar Church Road
Camp
Hill, Pennsylvania 17011
VIA
EDGAR
Securities
and Exchange Commission
100
F
Street, N.E.
Washington,
DC 20549
Attention:
Timothy A. Geishecker, Senior Counsel
Dear
Mr.
Geishecker:
Harsco
Corporation, a Delaware corporation (“we,”
“us” or the “Company”),
is
submitting this letter in response to the comment letter from the staff (the
“Staff”) of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(the “Commission”) dated September 26, 2007 (the
“Comment Letter”) with respect to the
Company’s
definitive proxy statement on Schedule 14A filed on March 20, 2007 (the
“2007 proxy statement”).
Below
are
the Company’s responses to each comment in the Comment Letter. For
the convenience of the Staff, we have repeated each of the Staff’s comments
before the response.
Compensation
Discussion and Analysis, page 19
1.
|
Please
discuss in reasonably complete detail the role of Mr. Hathaway in
your
compensation processes and his input during the crafting of compensation
packages. Discuss the extent to which Mr. Hathaway retains the
ability to call Compensation Committee meetings or meet with the
consultants used by the Compensation
Committee.
|
Response:
Mr.
Hathaway plays several roles in the Company’s compensation
processes. In general, he reviews the Company’s proposed overall
budget increases for executive officer salaries and approves, on an individual
basis, recommendations made by management regarding year-to-year executive
compensation increases. More specifically, Mr. Hathaway reviews both
(1) benchmark compensation materials and other related information provided
by
Towers Perrin, one of the Company’s compensation consultants, and (2)
recommendations submitted by members of the Company’s senior management team,
before submitting management’s recommendations to the Management Development and
Compensation Committee (the “Compensation Committee”)
regarding salary increases and changes to bonus percentages and equity
compensation awards for members of the Company’s senior management
team.
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
2
Mr.
Hathaway also provides the Compensation Committee with factual information
on
which it bases its decisions regarding his compensation. As an
example, Mr. Hathaway meets with the Compensation Committee in executive session
during each November to review the Company’s results for that fiscal
year. The Company’s independent directors participate in the November
session. Mr. Hathaway has no decision-making involvement with respect
to his own compensation. Instead, the Compensation Committee
determines its recommendation regarding Mr. Hathaway’s compensation package for
the subsequent fiscal year based on the facts gathered from its meeting with
Mr.
Hathaway, plus compensation survey information provided to the Company by Towers
Perrin and whatever other information and factors it chooses to consider from
year-to-year. The Compensation Committee promptly makes its
recommendation known to the full Board of Directors of the Company (the
“Board of Directors”) for its review and
approval.
As
Chairman of the Board of Directors, Mr. Hathaway has the authority to call
Compensation Committee meetings. The Company is not aware, however,
of any Compensation Committee meeting called by Mr. Hathaway during the past
four years. Additionally, as Chief Executive Officer of the Company,
Mr. Hathaway has the authority to call and hold meetings with each of Towers
Perrin and Stern Stewart & Company, the Company’s compensation consultants,
as these consultants are engaged by the Company, not the Board of Directors
or
any of its committees. The Company is unaware of any meeting between
Mr. Hathaway and any of the Company’s compensation consultants in recent
history.
The
Company anticipates expanding its compensation discussion in future filings,
including in the Company’s definitive proxy statement for the Company’s 2008
Annual Meeting of Stockholders (the “2008 proxy
statement”), to the extent such information remains
material.
2.
|
Please
disclose the specific items of corporation performance and individual
objectives used to determine incentive amounts and discuss how your
incentive awards are specifically structured around these performance
goals and objectives. See Item 402(b)(2)(v) of Regulation
S-K. Refer to your description of EVA, earnings per share and
cash flow targets and percentages on pages 23-25. To the extent
you believe that disclosure of these targets is not required because
it
would result in competitive harm such that you may omit the disclosure
under Instruction 4 to Item 402(b) of Regulation S-K, please provide
a
detailed supplemental analysis supporting your conclusion and provide
appropriate disclosure pursuant to Instruction 4. In discussing
how difficult it would be for the named executive officers or how
likely
it will be for you to achieve
the
|
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
3
undisclosed
target levels or other factors, please provide as much detail as necessary
without disclosing information that poses a reasonable risk of competitive
harm.
Response:
As
the
Company indicated in the 2007 proxy statement, the performance metrics for
its
annual incentive bonus program is economic value added improvement
(“EVA®”) and for its equity compensation program are
earnings per share for 2006, earnings per share and cash flow for 2007 and
2008,
and EVA for 2009 and thereafter.
While
the
concept of earnings per share is well understood, the EVA performance measure
may be less clear. EVA is an economic performance measure calculated
by subtracting from net operating profit after tax a charge for capital employed
in a particular business unit. The charge for capital employed in a
business unit is a product of the amount of capital utilized in the applicable
business unit and the particular weighted average cost of capital assigned
to
that business unit.
EVA
improvement is a measure of the growth anticipated by
shareholders. It represents the amount that EVA (calculated as
described above) must improve each year in order for the Company’s current
operations value (“COV”) to increase to its total
market value. COV is calculated as the sum of our current EVA capital
plus the value that would be produced if EVA was maintained at its current
level
(i.e., no growth in EVA) into perpetuity.
As
was
provided in the 2007 proxy statement, the 2006 EVA improvement target was
developed by the Company’s compensation consultant, Stern Stewart & Company,
based on the principles outlined above. The payout under the annual
incentive bonus program is based on the amount of economic value created in
the
appropriate year, both for the Company as a whole and for the business units
for
which a senior officer has responsibility. The EVA improvement target
for 2006 for the Company as a whole was $7,300,000. The EVA
improvement required for a target bonus payout for the business units for which
Mr. Butler was responsible was $4,864,000 and the EVA improvement required
for a
target bonus payout for the business units for which Mr. Neuffer was responsible
was $911,000.
In
addition to the EVA improvement target, an EVA interval both above and below
the
EVA improvement target is also calculated. The EVA intervals serve as
the guide for determining an officer’s performance bonus multiplier in terms of
the amount of EVA improvement actually achieved. For
example:
·
|
If
the annual EVA improvement achieved equals the target, the officer
receives 100% of his target performance
bonus.
|
·
|
Similarly,
if the annual EVA improvement achieved is within one interval above
or
below the target, the officer receives a percentage of his target
performance bonus, which is calculated by extrapolating the percentage
of
the interval achieved.
|
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
4
·
|
If
the annual EVA improvement achieved is more than one interval above
the
target, the officer would receive twice his target performance
bonus.
|
·
|
Conversely,
if the annual EVA improvement achieved is more than one interval
shy of
the target, the officer receives no
bonus.
|
For
2006,
the EVA interval for the Company as a whole was $32,000,000. The EVA
interval for those business units for which Mr. Butler has responsibility was
$25,800,000, and the EVA interval for the business units for which Mr. Neuffer
has responsibility was $8,600,000.
An
example of how the EVA system works may provide clarification. If the
Company as a whole achieved $7,300,000 in EVA improvement, those individuals
paid on Company-wide performance would receive their target payout amount
(100%). If instead the Company as a whole achieved $39,300,000
(i.e., $7,300,000 plus $32,000,000) or more in EVA improvement, an
individual paid on corporate performance would receive his or her maximum payout
amount (200%). If the amount of EVA improvement achieved was less
than $7,300,000 but more than a negative $24,700,000 (i.e., $7,300,000
minus $32,000,000), then the officer would be entitled to a payout, but the
payout would be an amount less than the target payout and calculated by
extrapolating the percent of the interval achieved. If the amount of
EVA improvement achieved was more than $7,300,000 but less than $39,300,000,
then the officer would be entitled to a payout in an amount more than the target
payout, but calculated by extrapolating the percent of the interval
achieved.
In
2006,
the Company as a whole produced $21,029,000 in EVA improvement ($13,729,000
above the applicable EVA target), which resulted in a bonus percentage of 143%
for those individuals whose bonuses were based on corporate
performance. The business units for which Mr. Butler was responsible
generated $13,922,000 in EVA improvement ($9,058,000 above the applicable EVA
target), which resulted in a bonus percentage of 135% for Mr.
Butler. The business units for which Mr. Neuffer was responsible
generated $9,969,000 in EVA improvement ($9,058,000 above the applicable EVA
target), which resulted in a bonus percentage of 200% for Mr.
Neuffer.
Under
the
equity compensation program, the performance metric for 2006 was earnings per
share. As explained in the 2007 proxy statement, if the established
earnings per share goal is achieved, then the target payout for restricted
stock
units (“RSUs”) awards may be paid out to the
participants. However, the Compensation Committee retains complete
subjective discretion to reduce any and all payouts if it does not believe
the
individual has made an appropriate contribution to the overall success of the
Company. Please see the Company’s response to comment #4 below for
more information on the Compensation Committee’s use of discretion in connection
with equity awards.
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
5
For
2006,
the earnings per share goal for the Company was $3.20. This goal was
established by the Compensation Committee and approved by the Board in January
2004. The actual earnings per share achieved by the Company in 2006
was $4.65. The significant over-achievement of this goal was the
result of several years of earnings growth of over 30%. This growth
was achieved by both strong organic growth within each of the Company’s
businesses, as well as numerous successful acquisitions that have added
substantial accretion. As a result of earnings per share achievement,
each of the named executive officers (the “named executive
officers”) received their full target RSU award.
The
Company anticipates providing disclosure similar to that provided in this
response to comment #2 regarding its historical performance targets in future
filings, including the 2008 proxy statement, to the extent such information
remains material and the disclosure of such information will not result in
competitive harm.
3.
|
On
pages 22, 23, and 26, you indicate that you have established performance
targets for 2007 and beyond. Disclose the targets in accordance
with Item 402(b)(2)(v) of Regulation S-K and Instruction 2 to Item
402(b).
|
Response:
As
the
Company indicated in the 2007 proxy statement, the Company provides incentive
compensation to its named executive officers through its annual cash incentive
compensation program and its long-term equity compensation program.
Annual
Cash Incentive Compensation Program
As
discussed in the Company’s response to comment #2 above, under the Company’s
1995 Executive Incentive Compensation Plan, the Company provides its named
executive officers with annual cash-based incentive awards. The
payout amount for these annual cash incentive awards is based upon achievement
of specific EVA goals established for the Company as a whole, as well as for
relevant Company business units.
The
Compensation Committee reviews and establishes incentive targets for the annual
cash incentive program prior to the first 90 days of each annual performance
cycle. The Compensation Committee, with the input of Stern Stewart
& Company, established target performance levels for Company-wide EVA for
each of 2007, 2008 and 2009 under the annual cash incentive plan, and has
allocated these target objectives among the Company’s divisions. An
EVA interval is also established, and performance relative to that interval
determines the bonus payout for EVA improvement achievement above or below
the
target. The EVA goals are recommended by Stern Stewart & Company
to the Compensation Committee.
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
6
Long-Term
Equity Compensation Program
Also
as
discussed in the Company’s response to comment #2 above, under the Company’s
1995 Executive Incentive Compensation Plan, the Company provides its named
executive officers with annual RSU grants. Each named executive
officer is granted an award of RSUs, but the actual number of shares
eventually issued to a named executive officer depends on the Company’s
achievement of the pre-established performance targets. If the
performance targets are not achieved, no RSU award payout can be
made. The Compensation Committee may also exercise negative
discretion to reduce a payout of shares to an amount below the targeted payout
amount.
For
2006,
the performance goals for the long-term equity compensation program were based
on the Company’s attainment of a pre-established earnings per share
target. For 2007 and 2008, the performance metrics are a combination
of earnings per share and operating cash flow. For 2009, the
performance metric is EVA achievement. The earnings per share and
operating cash flow targets are established by the Compensation Committee based
upon established growth objectives recommended by management, as further
described in the 2007 proxy statement. The EVA target for the period
ending December 31, 2009 is established by the Compensation Committee based
upon
recommendations made by Stern Stewart & Company in the same manner as
described above for the annual incentive program.
Competitive
Harm Analysis
The
Company advises the Staff that the remainder of the response to comment #3
is
being provided supplementally under separate cover. By separate
letter, the Company has requested confidential treatment of the remainder of
its
response to comment #3 pursuant to the provisions of 17 C.F.R. §
200.83.
4.
|
There
is minimal analysis and discussion of the effect individual performance
has on compensation awards despite disclosure that indicates that
you make
compensation-related decisions in connection with non-quantitative
achievements. Please disclose additional details and analysis
of how individual performance contributed to actual 2006 compensation
for
the named executive officers. For example, discuss in greater
detail the achievement of the financial and operational goals within
a
named executive officer’s individual area of
responsibility. See Item 402(b)(2)(vii) of Regulation
S-K.
|
Response:
The
primary factors that the Compensation Committee considers when making
compensation decisions for the Company’s named executive officers listed in the
Company’s “Summary Compensation Table” are those related to overall Company
performance, which are discussed in detail in the Company’s “Compensation
Discussion and Analysis” (“CD&A”). To a
much lesser extent, the Compensation Committee
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
7
considers
individual performance by each of the Company’s named executive officers during
the course of the year, as evaluated by the Compensation Committee in the case
of Mr. Hathaway, and by Mr. Hathaway and the Compensation Committee in the
case
of the Company’s other named executive officers. The Compensation
Committee also considers the performance of the Company’s divisions in the case
of the named executive officers who lead such divisions. If and when
individual performance is considered material by the Compensation Committee,
however, individual performance generally has an impact on compensation
decisions in only two ways, both of which involve the significant use of
discretion on the part of the Compensation Committee.
First,
if
applicable, the Compensation Committee considers individual performance when
determining named executive officers’ base salaries. As disclosed in
the 2007 proxy statement, numerous quantifiable factors are considered by the
Compensation Committee when making determinations regarding compensation for
named executive officers for the upcoming year. These factors include
the Company’s overall salary budget, overall Company financial performance, and
individual division performance (regarding named executive officers who lead
divisions), especially concerning EVA goals and income. However, if
and when individual performance is taken into account, other non-quantifiable
factors may be considered by the Compensation Committee when establishing
executives’ salaries, including the executives’ performance in leading
improvements in the financial performance of poorly performing businesses or
divisions, or addressing specific and major Company events or issues outside
the
ordinary course of business (e.g., acquisitions, divestitures,
financings, restructurings, etc.). Many of these “other” factors are
clearly not established, “hard and fast” performance goals, but are qualitative
individual performance factors that, if and when taken into consideration,
would
generally have a significant impact on our performance for the year and the
individual officer’s success in his or her position.
Second,
if applicable, the Compensation Committee also generally considers individual
performance when determining our named executive officers’ long-term incentive
compensation awards. When determining the equity awards to be paid
out to the named executive officers, the Compensation Committee will first
look
at the overall Company performance with respect to the pre-established financial
goal or goals, which for 2006 was earnings per share. If the overall
Company goal is satisfied, the Compensation Committee next looks to the
financial performance of the division for which the officer is responsible,
and
then to the officer’s individual and non-quantifiable contributions to the
Company during the fiscal year. If the Compensation Committee does
not believe that a named executive officer has adequately contributed to the
overall performance of the Company during the fiscal year, the Compensation
Committee may reduce the number of shares paid to the officer (assuming that
Company-wide performance targets have been achieved such that RSU payouts would
have otherwise been approved). The Compensation Committee exercised
this type of negative discretion when determining equity payouts for 2006 with
respect to certain officers other than the named executive
officers.
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
8
For
2006,
overall Company performance (EVA, earnings per share and cash flow) was the
primary factor that the Compensation Committee considered when making
compensation decisions for the Company’s named executive officers, and
individual performance was considered to a much lesser extent. To
this end, the Compensation Committee considered the following individual
performance and other quantifiable and non-quantifiable factors (including
financial performance factors involving particular divisions within a named
executive officer’s area of responsibility) when making compensation decisions
for the following named executive officers:
·
|
For
Mr. Hathaway: overall Company growth; management development; and
the
Company’s successful completion of significant
transactions;
|
·
|
For
Mr. Butler: EVA, growth and management development for the Company’s
access services and mill services divisions; and the Company’s successful
integration of recent acquisitions;
|
·
|
For
Mr. Fazzolari: overall Company growth looking primarily to financial
measures and overall strategic development
goals;
|
·
|
For
Mr. Kimmel: the Company’s successful completion of significant
transactions; the Company’s handling of major litigation matters and other
legal issues; implementation of human resources plans; and the successful
management of risk management issues;
and
|
·
|
For
Mr. Neuffer: EVA, growth and reorganization of certain companies
within
the Company’s recently renamed Minerals and Rail Technologies
Group.
|
The
Company anticipates including disclosure similar to that provided in this
response to comment #4 of how individual performance impacts compensation
decisions in future filings, including the 2008 proxy statement, to the extent
such information remains material.
5.
|
The
precise nature of your benchmarking activities is not
clear. Please identify the companies, including those whose
information is included in the information supplied by the compensation
consultants, the Committee evaluated during its review of the market
position of your executive compensation practices. If you have
benchmarked different elements of your compensation against different
benchmarking groups, please identify the companies that comprise
each
group. Refer to Item 402(b)(2)(xiv) of Regulation
S-K.
|
Response:
The
Compensation Committee benchmarks salaries, total cash compensation (i.e.,
salary plus annual cash incentives) and total direct compensation
(i.e., salary plus annual cash incentives and long-term incentive
awards) annually against survey data provided by Towers Perrin during Towers
Perrin’s annual review of executive compensation for the Company’s senior
executive officers. No other benchmarking is undertaken by the
Compensation Committee for compensation purposes.
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
9
In
preparing the survey data it provides to the Compensation Committee, Towers
Perrin utilizes a broad industry-wide benchmarking database of over 800
companies. Information regarding the specific companies included in
Towers Perrin’s database is available to the Company upon its
request. In completing its analysis that is eventually provided to
the Compensation Committee, Towers Perrin takes into account the size of the
Company and its lines of business by using regression analysis to size-adjust
the database information such that the market data provided corresponds to
organizations and business units of similar size.
The
Company anticipates including further discussion and clarification of its
benchmarking process and activities and information regarding the specific
companies included in the Towers Perrin database in future filings, including
the 2008 proxy statement, to the extent such information remains
material.
6.
|
In
various locations, you state that you “strive to maintain total
compensation packages which range from moderately below to moderately
above industry medians.” Please clarify the disclosure relating
to where you target compensation in relation to the industry
median. Discuss where you target each element of compensation
against the comparator companies and where actual payments fall within
targeted parameters. Disclose the actual percentiles for total
compensation, and each benchmarked element of compensation, in
2006. To the extent actual compensation was outside a targeted
percentile range, please explain
why.
|
Response:
In
general, the Compensation Committee benchmarks named executive officers’
salaries, total cash compensation (which consists of the executives’ salaries
and annual cash incentives), and total direct compensation (which consists
of
the executives’ salaries, annual cash incentives and long-term incentive awards)
each at the 50th percentile
of the
survey data provided by Towers Perrin (as discussed above in the Company’s
response to comment #5). However, from year-to-year, the Compensation
Committee may use positive or negative discretion to set a named executive
officer’s salary, total cash compensation and total direct compensation either
above or below the 50th percentile,
which
results in a general range of named executive officer salaries, total cash
compensation and total direct compensation over time of both moderately below
to
moderately above the 50th percentile
(which
is what the Company views as industry medians). For example, for
individuals who are relatively new to their positions, or may have performed
below expectations, their salaries may be established as much as 15% below
the
50th
percentile. Internal pay equity considerations and management input
also play a role in the level at which salaries are ultimately established
by
the Compensation Committee. For example, for the Company’s strongest
performing executives, or individuals who have been in their jobs for a
considerable period of time, etc., their salaries, total cash compensation
and
total direct compensation may be established as much as 15% above the 50th
percentile. In all instances, however, and even when exercising
discretion, the Compensation Committee generally still aims to keep salaries,
total cash compensation and total direct compensation as close to the 50th percentile
as
possible.
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
10
In
reviewing salary, total cash compensation and total direct compensation, the
Compensation Committee considers how each named executive officer’s compensation
compares to the 50th
percentile. For 2006, the Company’s named executive officers’ target
compensation was determined to be at the following percentiles of the
benchmark group:
|
|
Salary
|
|
Total
Cash Compensation
|
|
Total
Direct
Compensation
|
Mr.
Hathaway
|
|
54%
|
|
48.5%
|
|
37%
|
Mr.
Butler
|
|
48.5%
|
|
47%
|
|
52%
|
Mr.
Fazzolari
|
|
49.5%
|
|
49%
|
|
44.5%
|
Mr.
Kimmel
|
|
30%
|
|
28.5%
|
|
32.5%
|
Mr.
Neuffer
|
|
38.5%
|
|
35%
|
|
32.5%
|
The
only
three named executive officers for whom compensation was established outside
the
range discussed above are Mr. Hathaway (in terms of total direct compensation)
and Messrs. Kimmel and Neuffer (in terms of each of salary, total cash
compensation and total direct compensation). Mr. Hathaway’s result is
due to Mr. Hathaway’s declining salary increases during the past several years
and the conservative RSU grants provided in the initial years of the RSU
program, which was established by the Board of Directors in January
2004. Mr. Kimmel’s result is because he is fairly new to his position
(three years as of 2006) and received a relatively low starting base salary
when
he moved into his position. Mr. Neuffer’s result is because of his
increasing responsibilities, his lower base salary prior to moving into
positions with greater responsibility and the conservative RSU grants provided
in the initial years of the RSU program. The Compensation Committee
considered these rationales when establishing compensation for Messrs. Hathaway,
Kimmel and Neuffer, and determined that the results were
acceptable.
The
Company anticipates including disclosure similar to that provided in this
response to comment #6 of its compensation benchmarking practices and policies
in future filings, including the 2008 proxy statement, to the extent such
information remains material.
7.
|
Identify
the material differences in compensation policies with respect to
individual named executive officers in your Compensation Discussion
and
Analysis. Please refer to Section II.B.1. of Commission Release
No. 33-8732A. We note disparities in Mr. Hathaway’s stock
awards and non-equity incentive plan compensation as compared to
that of
other named executive officers. Notwithstanding the disclosure
on page 30, please provide a more detailed discussion of how and
why Mr.
Hathaway’s compensation differs from that of the other named executive
officers. If policies or decisions relating to a named
executive officer are materially different from the other officers,
please
discuss this on an individualized
basis.
|
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
11
Response:
The
Company utilizes the same compensation program philosophy and objectives for
each of its named executive officers. As a result, salary, annual
incentive awards and long term incentive awards for the Company’s named
executive officers generally differ only in terms of quantum. The
Compensation Committee did not specifically structure its compensation decisions
to create notable disparity between the compensation elements paid to the
Company’s named executive officers. Instead, the differences between
the amounts paid to Mr. Hathaway and the Company’s other named executive
officers results from the standard application of the Company’s compensation
policies and formulae as disclosed in the 2007 proxy statement, and specifically
result from considerations such as:
·
|
Differences
in the scope of responsibilities held by the named executive
officers;
|
·
|
Benchmarking
performance related to salaries, total cash compensation and total
direct
compensation;
|
·
|
Length
of service with the Company and in specific positions;
and
|
·
|
Performance
(specifically the effect of what the Compensation Committee has viewed
as
exceptional performance) of duties during a named executive officer’s
tenure with the Company.
|
The
Company anticipates providing an analysis of any material disparities in the
amounts paid as compensation to the Company’s named executive officers in future
filings, including the 2008 proxy statement.
With
respect to 2006, however, the Compensation Committee chose to structure Mr.
Hathaway’s RSU grant differently than those for the other named executive
officers. In general, when RSUs are paid out to the Company’s
executive officers based on the achievement of applicable performance criteria,
the RSUs vest over a three-year period. Settlement for the vested RSU
award is generally made in shares, net of all taxes. When this
program was introduced in 2005, however, the Compensation Committee took into
consideration Mr. Hathaway’s intention to retire within a few years, his equity
holdings in the Company and his diversification plans. Based on these
considerations, the Compensation Committee determined to settle Mr. Hathaway’s
RSU awards in cash rather than shares. Mr. Hathaway announced his
retirement as the Company’s Chief Executive Officer in September 2007, which
retirement will be effective December 31, 2007. As a result, the
Company anticipates that all named executive officers will have the same
structure in 2008 and beyond.
The
Company will provide disclosure of this disparity in future filings, including
the 2008 proxy statement, to the extent it remains material.
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
12
8.
|
Please
disclose the relationships between the Committee, Stern Stewart &
Company and Towers Perrin to provide a materially complete description
of
each consultant’s role with the company. You state that Stern
Stewart deals with the EVA and Towers Perrin deals with other matters
yet
the precise nature and scope of each consultant’s assignment is not
clear. See Item 407(e)(3)(iii) of Regulation
S-K.
|
Response:
The
Company’s annual incentive compensation program was designed and is overseen by
Stern Stewart & Company. As further described in the Company’s
response to comment #9 below, each year Stern Stewart & Company assists our
Compensation Committee with identifying annual EVA objectives at both the
company-wide and division levels for the annual incentive compensation
program. More specifically, Stern Stewart & Company calculates
these EVA targets, as well as the EVA intervals that determine the level of
compensation if actual results are above or below the target, and reviews and
discusses these calculations with the Compensation Committee on an annual
basis. Although management provides Stern Stewart & Company with
sufficient information to calculate the EVA targets, management is not otherwise
involved in this process. While Stern Stewart & Company works
directly with the Compensation Committee, it has been engaged by the Company
and
not by the Board of Directors or any of its committees.
Towers
Perrin is the Company’s actuary and has provided various compensation and
benefits advice to the Company for years. One historical aspect of
these services has been for Towers Perrin to provide executive compensation
benchmarking data to the Compensation Committee as requested. Until
two years ago, this benchmarking data was provided every other
year. Since then, the benchmarking data has been provided
annually. Towers Perrin generally does not meet with the Compensation
Committee. As with Stern Stewart & Company, Towers Perrin has
been engaged by the Company and not by the Board of Directors or any of its
committees.
The
Company anticipates clarifying the relationships among the Compensation
Committee, Stern Stewart & Company and Towers Perrin, and the nature and
scope of each consultant’s assignment, in future filings, including the 2008
proxy statement, to the extent such information remains
material.
Annual
Incentive Compensation Plan, page 24
9.
|
Please
ensure that you provide sufficient analysis of how you arrived at
and why
you paid each of the particular levels and forms of compensation
for
2006. For example, you provide little, if any, analysis of how
the application of the formula for the awarding of short-term cash
incentive compensation resulted in the specific payouts set forth
in the
last full paragraph on page 25. Provide a description of the
specific levels of achievement of each named executive officer relative
to
the targets as well as any additional information pertaining to each
|
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
13
|
individual’s
performance that the Committee considered in determining specific
payout
levels for 2006. Notwithstanding the disclosure in the fourth
full paragraph of page 24, please consider providing a specific
example of
how the respective weighted factors in the formula work in practice
by
applying the formula to an actual award made to a named executive
officer
in a given fiscal year. See Item 402(b)(1)(v) of Regulation
S-K.
|
Response:
As
described in the 2007 proxy statement, actual payouts under the Company’s annual
incentive compensation plan are formula driven. Each named executive
officer’s target payout amount equals his or her annual salary multiplied by a
bonus percentage. The bonus percentage is determined by multiplying
the officer’s salary grade by 0.02, and represents the target bonus percentage
that the officer is eligible to receive for the given year. For
example, if an officer’s salary grade is 50, his or her bonus percentage would
be 1.00 (or 100%). In that example, the officer’s target payout under
the annual incentive compensation plan would be 100% of his or her annual
salary.
In
determining actual payouts under the annual incentive program, the Compensation
Committee multiplies an officer’s target payout amount by a performance
factor. The performance factor is calculated based on the Company’s
success in achieving its EVA targets in a given year (at a company-wide level
for corporate officers and at the division level for division
leaders). Stern Stewart & Company recommends expected EVA levels
at both a company-wide level and for each of the Company’s divisions and an EVA
interval that determines performance levels at above or below the target level
to the Compensation Committee, which adopts the final EVA targets and
intervals. After the fiscal year is complete, the Compensation
Committee determines the performance factor by applying the bonus formula to
calculate what percentage of the EVA target was achieved by the Company (at
either a company-wide level or at a division level, as
applicable). For each officer, the performance factor is then
multiplied by his or her target payout amount to determine his or her actual
payout under the annual incentive compensation plan.
As
disclosed in the 2007 proxy statement, the Compensation Committee determined
that the following performance factors were achieved regarding respective EVA
targets for the Company’s named executive officers: Mr. Butler, 135%;
Mr. Neuffer, 200%; and for each of Messrs. Hathaway, Fazzolari and Kimmel,
143%. No aspects of individual performance were considered by the
Compensation Committee in determining actual payouts under the annual incentive
compensation plan.
As
an
example, in the 2007 proxy statement, the Company disclosed that Mr. Fazzolari
received an actual payout of 143% of his target payout amount based on
company-wide EVA achievement. Mr. Fazzolari’s annual incentive
compensation payout was calculated as follows:
·
|
For
2006, Mr. Fazzolari’s salary was $450,000 and his salary grade was
32;
|
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
14
·
|
Multiplying
Mr. Fazzolari’s salary grade (32) by 0.02 results in a bonus percentage of
64%. As a result, Mr. Fazzolari’s target payout amount for 2006
equaled $288,000 (or $450,000 multiplied by
64%);
|
·
|
The
Compensation Committee determined that the Company achieved 143%
of the
company-wide EVA target established for 2006, resulting in a performance
factor of 1.43; and
|
·
|
Multiplying
Mr. Fazzolari’s target payout amount ($288,000) by the performance factor
(1.43) results in an actual payout amount for 2006 of
$411,840.
|
In
future
filings, including the 2008 proxy statement, the Company anticipates providing
additional analysis regarding its annual incentive compensation plan
calculations and payouts to the extent such analysis remains
material.
Termination
or Change in Control Agreements, page 41
10.
|
Please
disclose how you determined the appropriate payment and benefit levels
under the various circumstances that trigger payments or provision
of
benefits. Also, in the Compensation Discussion and Analysis,
discuss how these arrangements fit into your overall compensation
objectives and affect the decisions you made regarding other compensation
elements. See paragraphs (b)(1)(v) and (j)(3) of Item 402 of
Regulation S-K.
|
Response:
In
connection with the Compensation Committee’s review of the Company’s change in
control agreements in 2005, the Compensation Committee also reviewed and
considered the payment and benefit levels provided for under the termination
and
change in control arrangements with the Company’s named executive
officers.
As
a
result of its reviews and analyses, the Compensation Committee approved
reductions in certain features of the Company’s change in control arrangements
due to the fact that prior payment levels were no longer consistent with the
Company’s philosophy regarding severance payments in general, which looks inward
and to the Company’s overall employee severance arrangements rather than outward
and toward a review of peer company policies. The Compensation
Committee, following such review, determined that the remaining payment and
benefit levels provided for under the change in control and other termination
arrangements were consistent with the Company’s general severance
philosophy. The modifications to the Company’s change in control
agreements were disclosed on page 29 of the 2007 proxy statement. The
Company anticipates disclosing its analysis regarding the appropriateness of
the
payment and benefit levels provided for under the termination and change in
control arrangements with the Company’s named executive officers in future
filings, including the 2008 proxy statement, to the extent such analysis remains
material.
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
15
In
CD&A, under the subheading “Total Compensation” on page 22, the Company
indicated that benefits that are particular to an individual executive officer,
including those provided under change of control agreements, are reviewed by
the
Compensation Committee on a regular basis, but not necessarily as part of the
annual compensation review process discussed in further detail in
CD&A. The Company generally considers the change of control
agreements as compensation elements separate and apart from the other elements
of its compensation arrangements. More specifically, the payments or
benefits available under the change of control agreements do not have any
significant impact on the Compensation Committee’s general compensation
decisions relating to salary and incentive payments. Instead, the
Compensation Committee considers that the change in control agreements are
in
place to cover a specific and unlikely circumstance, namely if the Company
is
acquired and the executives lose their jobs. In this way, payments
and benefits available under the change of control agreements are not viewed
by
the Compensation Committee as amounts that should impact the compensation
amounts awarded on a year-to-year basis to the named executive officers for
their ongoing management of the Company.
The
Company anticipates disclosing its analysis regarding the impact of these types
of payments and benefits in future filings, including the 2008 proxy statement,
to the extent such analysis remains material.
Transactions
with Related Persons, page 46
11.
|
You
indicate that your related policies and procedures regarding transactions
with related persons are contained in the Nominating and Corporate
Governance Committee Charter. You also reference your Code of
Conduct in the last paragraph of this subsection. Please
clarify the relevance of the Code of Conduct to your policies and
procedures regarding transactions with related
persons.
|
Response:
The
Company referenced its Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee Charter
in
the first paragraph under the subheading “Policies and Procedures Regarding
Transactions with Related Persons” to indicate the source of the charge by which
the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee is required to review and
approve all material related person transactions. The Company’s
policies and procedures regarding this review, however, are summarized in the
immediately subsequent paragraph.
The
Company’s Code of Conduct applies to each of its directors and employees as,
among other things, the primary guide for what the Company expects of its
directors, officers and employees regarding handling potential and actual
conflicts of interest. The section of the Code of Conduct entitled
“Serving our Markets with Integrity” covers the concept of conflicts of interest
and the Company’s view regarding when an inappropriate undertaking may be
occurring. While the Company understands that a related party
transaction may not be a per se conflict of interest, the Company
believes that related
Securities
and Exchange Commission
November
21, 2007
Page
16
party
transactions and conflicts of interest are sufficiently related concepts so
as
to warrant discussion of the Company’s conflicts of interest views in this
subsection.
The
Company anticipates clarifying this disclosure in future filings, including
the
2008 proxy statement.
* * *
The
Company acknowledges that:
·
|
it
is responsible for the adequacy and accuracy of the disclosure in
its 2007
definitive proxy statement;
|
·
|
Staff
comments or changes to disclosure in response to comments do not
foreclose
the Commission from taking any action with respect to its 2007 definitive
proxy statement; and
|
·
|
the
Company may not assert Staff comments as a defense in any proceeding
initiated by the Commission or any person under the federal securities
law
of the United States.
|
If
you
have any questions regarding these matters, please do not hesitate to contact
the undersigned.
Sincerely,
/s/
Mark
E. Kimmel
Mark
E.
Kimmel
General
Counsel and
Corporate
Secretary